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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
It is submitted that social policy would be served better if the
second discharge had been given effect. Under the spirit of the Bank-
ruptcy Act some definite end to litigation must arrive. To hold other-
wise may cause undue hardship on former bankrupts who have begun
business anew, believing that their old debts had been discharged
years before.
George M. Unruh
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-MUNI-
CIPAL CORPORATIONS-MILK ORDINANCES-VALIDITY. An or-
dinance of Madison, Wisconsin, prohibited the sale of milk (a) collect-
ed from farms located more than 25 miles, or (b) pasteurized at
plants located more than 5 miles, from the central square of the city.
Plaintiff Dean Milk Company, an Illinois corporation, applied for but
was denied a license to sell its milk in Madison, solely because its
sources and pasteurization plants were located in northern Illinois
beyond the limits prescribed by the ordinance. Pointing out that its
milk is inspected and rated "Grade A" by both Chicago and United
States Public Health inspectors, the Dean Milk Company contended
that both sections of the Madison ordinance violate the. Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
The Supreme Court of the United States, three justices dissenting,
held that the challenged sections impose an undue burden upon in-
terstate commerce and are therefore unconstitutional. Dean Milk Co.
v. City of Madison, 71 Sup. Ct. 295 (1951). "In thus erecting an econ-
omic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition
from without the state, Madison plainly discriminates against inter-
state commerce."1
The Court objected not to the purppse of the ordinance-to obviate
health dangers created by sale of milk from remote areas-but rather
to the means by which the city hoped to achieve its purpose. Both
the Madison Health Commissioner and the sanitarian of the Wisconsin
State Board of Health agreed that there were other workable alterna-
tives, and the Court, in dictum, declared these preferable to the Madi-
son ordinance. First, the city could accomplish satisfactory inspection
of milk from outlying pasteurization plants by having its own offi-
cials conduct inspections and by charging "the actual and reasonable
cost of such inspection to the importing producers and processors."'
Second, the city could adopt a milk regulatory program based on sec-
tion 11 of the Model Milk Ordinance recommended by the United
States Public Health Service, which in effect permits sale of milk
from other localities whose inspection standards are equivalent.!
1 Id. at 298.
Id. at 298.
Section 11 of the Model Milk Ordinance recommended by the United
States Public Health Service reads, in part, as follows: "Milk and milk
products from points beyond the limits of routine inspection of the city
of .. . . may not be sold in the city of . . . or its police jurisdiction,
unless produced and/or pasteurized under provisions equivalent to the
requirements of this ordinance; provided that the health officer shall sat-
isfy himself that the health officer having jurisdiction over the production
and pricessing is properly enforcing such provisions."
RECENT CASES
A municipal corporation exercises its authority, generally, through
powers derived from and granted to it by the state. It has unquestion-
ed authority within the scope of its police power to pass ordinances
affecting and regulating public health and safety, especially as regards
the milk industry,' but in so doing, its ordinances must not be a direct
or undue burden on interstate commerce.' The exercise of this author-
ity must be reasonable and appropriate, ' not arbitrary, capricious, or
discriminatory.' It cannot be used to prevent a person from engaging
in a lawful business! The milk company involved in the instant case
has successfully challenged similar ordinances promulgated by Illinois
cities.! It should be noted, however, that the ordinances invalidated in
these Illinois decisions violated an Illinois statute" limiting municipal
jurisdiction to places within one-half mile of the corporate limits,
while the decision in the instant case is bottomed solely upon an
unwarranted interference with interstate commerce. Obviously the
decision under discussion is not authority for a situation where milk
sources and pasteurization plants are within the same state as the
challenged municipal ordinance.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has declared unconstitutional an
ordinance of the City of Minneapolis, requiring that all milk sold
Numerous cases sustain regulation of the milk industry in the interests of
public health and safety. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934) (labelling the milk industry as "'one clothed with a public inter-
est"); Carpenter v. City of Little Rock, 101 Ark. 238, 142 S.W. 162
(1911); City of Chicago v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 275 Ill. 30, 113 N.E.
849 (1916) (regulated temperature of milk cans); State v. Nelson, 66
Minn. 166, 68 N.W. 1066 (1896); City of St. Louis v. Liessing, 190 Mo.
464, 89 S.W. 611 (1905); Cofman v. Ousterhaus, 40 N.D. 390, 168
N.W. 826 (1918) (holding that North Dakota's creamery business is
"affected with a public interest"); New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van
de Carr 175 N.Y. 440, 67 N.E. 913, aff'd, vTr U.S. 552 (1905); Korth
v. Portland, 123 Ore, 180, 261 Pac. 895 (1927). But cf. Sheffield Farms
Co. v. Seaman, 114 N.J.L. 455, 177 Atl. 372 (1935).
Miller v. Williams, 12 F. Supp. 236, 242 (D. Md. 1935).
Natural Milk Producers Ass'n v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d 101, 124 P.2d
25, 29 (1942), vacated as moot and cause remanded, 317 U.S. 423 (1942);
Koy v. Chicago, 263 Ill. 122, 104 N.E. 1104 (1914); People ex rel.
Lodes v. Dep't of Health, 189 N.Y. 187, 82 N.E. 187 (1907); Stephens
v. Oklahoma City, 150 Okla. 199, 1 P.2d 367 (1931).
Grant v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 267, 82 S.W.2d 283, 286 (1935); State ex rel.
Larson v. Minneapolis, 190 Minn. 138, 251 N.W. 121 (1933); City of
Abilene v. Tennessee Dairies, 225 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
Meridian, Ltd. v. Sippy, 54 Cal. App. 2d 214, 128 P.2d 884, 889 (1942).
But cf. Duffcon Concrete Products v. Borough of Cresskill, 1. N.J. 509,
64 A.2d 347 (1949).
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Elgin, 405 Ill. 204, 90 N.E.2d 112, 114 (1950);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Aurora, 404 Ill. 331, 88 N.E.2d 827, 830
(1949); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Waukegan, 403 Ill. 597, 87 N.E.2d
751 (1949).
10 fll. Rev. Stat. c. 24, 0 23-40-63 (1947). For discussions of the ex-
traterritorial effect of city ordinances, see Note, 14 A.L.R.2d. 103 (1949);
and see Anderson, The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities, 10 Minn. L. Rev.
475 and 564 (1926), at 572, where it is stated, "The principal purpose
of setting municipal boundaries is to set a territorial limit to the city's
governmental powers. Municipal regulations are, therefore, felt primarily
by the local inhabitants. Both indirectly and directly, however, a great
many city ordinances have an appreciable extraterritorial effect."
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within the city be pasteurized within the city limits.u A study of the
cases indicates that most ordinances are unsuccessful which attempt
to designate territorial limits, from outside of which the importation
of milk is prohibited: e. g., a 25 mile routine inspection zone, 12 10 miles
from the city limits,1 3 and the boundaries of the immediate county.'
Other efforts at regulation, nearly all of them successful, include in-
spection of the pasteurization plant,1 inspection of all milk sold within
city limits," inspection of herds," tuberculin testing of herds,' and
limitation of sale to pasteurized milk only.1
It is not unlikely that many cities in North Dakota have ordinances
resembling the ordinance of Madison, Wisconsin, which the instant
case has declared invalid as an undue burden on interstate commerce.
The City of Grand Forks, North Dakota, for example, in section 14-
0203, Chapter 14 of the Revised Ordinances of 1948, establishes a 15
mile limit for maximum location of a pasteurization plant offering
milk for sale within the city, but there is an additional provision stat-
ing that pasteurization plants located beyond the 15 mile limit "....
shall be required to pay the actual cost of the inspection service
to such producers, which said cost is hereby fixed and determined at
the sum of five dollars ($5.00) per inspection, plus five cents (5c) per
mile for transportation beyond the corporate limits of the City of
Grand Forks." The weight of the cases would appear to sustain this
ordinance.
The decision of the instant case will have a determining influence
on the interpretation and revision of many existing milk ordinances.
It modifies the general rule that ordinances and statutes enacted un-
der the police power are presumptively constitutional if reasonably
related to the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare."
Henceforth, where such legislation burdens interstate commerce, it
will be struck down if reasonable alternatives are available which do
not so interfere with interstate commerce.
Frederick E. Martin.
State ex rel. Larson v. City of Minneapolis, 190 Minn. 138, 251 N.W.
121 (1933), Note, 18 Minn. L. Rev. 841 (1934); accord, Van Gammeren
v. City of Fresno, 51 Cal. App. 2d 235, 124 P.2d 621 (1942); La Franchi
v. City of Santa Rosa, 8 Cal. 2d 331, 65 P.2d 1301 (1937). Contra: Witt
v. Klimm, 97 Cal. App. 131, 274 Pac. 1039 (1929). Cf. Lang's Creamery
v. City of Niagara Falls, 251 N.Y. 343, 167 N.E. 464 (1929).
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Aurora, 404 Ill. 331, 88 N.E.2d 827 (1949)
(invalid).
Higgins v. City of Galesburg, 401 IUI. 87, 81 N.E.2d 520 (1948). Contra:
Dyer v. City of Beloit, 250 Wis. 613, 27 N.W.2d 733 (1947), judgment
vacated and remanded as moot, 333 U.S. 825 (194-8).
14 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Waukegan, 403 Ill. 597, 87 N.E.2d 751 (1949)
(invalid); Moultrie Milk Shed v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348, 57 S.E.2d
199 (1950) (unconstitutional as discriminatory against plants located out-
side of the county.)
Korth v. Portland, 123 Ore. 180, 261 Pac. 895 (1927) (valid).
" Deems v. Mayor of Baltimore, 80 Md. 164, 30 Atd. 648 (1894) (valid);
City of Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va, 473, 44 S.E. 717 (1903) (valid).
State v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 68 N.W. 1066 (1896).
Adams v. City of Milwaukee. 228 U.S. 572 (1913); Dorssom v. City of
Atchison, 155 Kan. 225, 124 P.2d 475 (1942).
City of Phoenix v. Breuninger, 50 Ariz. 372, 72 P.2d 580 (1937).6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 20.06 (3d ed. 1949).
